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P hilosophy, particularly the discipline of metaphysics, has long concerned itself with the problem of causation. Though the nature of causation may seem intuitively obvious or axiomatic, it is precisely due to these im-
pressions that it deserves deep philosophical investigation. There 
is never any doubt that causation exists in some way (that is, hat 
events somehow ’lead’ to other events). However, what exactly is 
meant by saying “A causes B” is not so clear. The difficulty of 
this question becomes more evident when one looks at the long 
string of illustrious philosophers who have attempted its solu-
tion – from David Hume’s anti-realist regularity theory of causa-
tion, 1 to John Mackie’s more elaborate explanation 2 in a similar 
tradition. The most recent of these propositions, and one that has 
proven particularly influential, is David Lewis’s theory of possi-
ble worlds. 3  
This paper will analyze Lewis’s view, examining both its ad-
vantages and its flaws. It will examine the viability of the entire 
“possible worlds” enterprise, looking at two traditional critiques 
of this approach as well as a more original argument. Of particu-
lar interest will be the phenomenon of preemption and the prob-
lems this phenomenon presents for Lewis’s view. Though pre-
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emption has long been problematic for many theories of causa-
tion, it will be argued here that the issue is in fact much less seri-
ous than it appears, not only for Lewis’s account, but for all oth-
ers as well. Finally, the viability of Lewis’s theory will be exam-
ined in light of both its flaws and advantages. 
In David Lewis’s account, a statement of causation is similar 
to a counterfactual statement. 4 Saying “A caused B” is thus 
much like saying “If A had occurred, B would have occurred 
also, and if A had not occurred, then B would not have oc-
curred.” It is important to note the difference between counter-
factual conditional statements and material conditional state-
ments, which are usually of the form “If A, then B.” In a material 
conditional, B is true only if A is, and to check whether A is true 
one need only compare its claim to the state of the world. Coun-
terfactuals have a different nature – rather than making claims 
about what is, counterfactuals concern themselves with what 
could be. So if A were true, what would be the consequences for 
B? Here, a problem quickly arises. How can one check the valid-
ity of any given counterfactual conditional? A brief illustration: 
while the truth of the material conditional, “If Jimmy drove, he 
crashed his car” is easy to check through reference to real events, 
how would one check the counterfactual, “If Jimmy had driven, 
he would have crashed his car?” Since this statement does not 
concern what actually happened, its validity cannot be deter-
mined by reference to any real event. Rather, information might 
be required on how safe Jimmy’s driving is generally, what car 
he drives, the road conditions and, in fact, an infinite number of 
other factors. 
It seems, therefore, that any theory that uses counterfactuals 
requires some scheme by which their validity can be determined. 
Lewis was aware of this issue and proposed a solution that 
serves as the basis for his theory – the idea of possible worlds. 
The claim is that our universe is only one of an infinite number 
of possible worlds, and that each of these worlds is different in 
some respect; anything from a minor detail such as the color of a 
given chair, to things as drastic as the laws of physics. In fact, the 
only laws that all possible worlds must follow are the laws of 
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logic, such as the law of non-contradiction, which says that no 
proposition can be both true and false. Using this idea, Lewis 
claims that in order to check whether a counterfactual condi-
tional is true, one must simply look at the nearest possible world 
in which the prerequisite condition (called “A” above) holds. The 
nearest possible world is one in which as many aspects of the 
world as possible are similar to ours. So if A is true in our world, 
then ours is the nearest possible world required. If A does not 
hold, then by definition the possible world of interest is the one 
where absolutely everything is identical to our world, except that 
A holds. For instance, if a counterfactual is concerned with a spe-
cific red chair being blue, then the nearest possible world that 
must be examined is the one where that chair indeed happens to 
be blue, but everything else is unchanged from our world. Lewis 
proposes that in this nearest possible world it is possible to turn 
the original counterfactual claim of interest into a material condi-
tional claim; that is, since A is true in this world of interest, we 
should check if B is also true. If that is the case, then the material 
conditional holds in this possible world, which logically implies 
that the original counterfactual holds in ours.  
Causation is, in fact, a bit more complicated. To claim that 
event A caused event B, one must first validate the correspond-
ing counterfactual (what Lewis calls “causal dependence”), but 
there also must be a chain of events of any length, termed a 
“causal chain,” leading from event A to event B, with every 
event causally dependant on its predecessor. With this scheme, it 
is worth noting that while causal dependence is sufficient for 
causation (by definition, it is simply a causal chain with two 
members), causation is not simply causal dependence. This is 
because causation is a transitive relationship (A can cause B, can 
cause C, etc.) while causal dependence is not. 
While this approach may seem promising, it is not without its 
flaws. The most obvious argument that can be leveled at the pos-
sible worlds theory is that it is too demanding, metaphysically. 
This argument is something of a reductio ad absurdum – the kind 
of use of possible worlds that Lewis proposes implies that they 
exist, a notion that is absurd and impossible. After all, if one ac-
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cepts the existence of infinite possible worlds somewhere in the 
realm of reality, one might as well accept ghosts, witches or any 
other number of potentially convenient explanatory agents that 
cannot be shown to exist. This argument is even more cogent 
given Lewis’s conviction that possible worlds are in fact real enti-
ties, 5 to the point that we are only one of these worlds, such that 
a person in another possible world considering us is no less real 
than we are while considering that person’s possible world. 
However, if one rejects this belief, there does not appear to be 
any reason to be convinced by the above criticism. Though it 
may seem devastating at first to Lewis’s theory to reject the idea 
that possible worlds are real entities in the physical non-abstract 
sense in which Lewis views them, this is not the case. After all, 
convenient logical devices are commonly used without any need 
to establish a physical existence. One obvious example comes 
from our use of numbers. Though whether abstract objects such 
as numbers are in some sense “real” is still an ongoing debate, 
there is no doubt that numbers are not physical entities in the 
sense that possible worlds are claimed to be. Nevertheless, and 
regardless of whether they are real or not, it is difficult to deny 
their theoretical usefulness. In a similar way, there is no need to 
claim that possible worlds exist as physical entities in order to 
employ them for testing counterfactuals. Granting possible 
worlds the same ontological status as abstract objects seems 
more than sufficient. 
Another issue that has long been used to challenge most 
theories of causation is the question of preemption. 6 Preemption 
occurs when some event A causes event B, but if A had not 
caused event B, then some event A-2 would have caused B. The 
issue for Lewis’s approach arises from his use of counterfactuals 
in the concept of causal dependence. If B would have occurred 
regardless of A, then it would seem that A did not cause B be-
cause one of the two conditions of Lewis’s causal dependence 
does not hold. If A had not occurred, then B still would have oc-
curred. 
However, there is a problem with the idea of preemption, 
and with the criticism it implies: is the B that occurs due to A the 
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same as that B that would have occurred due to A-2? An example 
will illustrate the issue. If Jimmy crashes his car (B) because he 
falls asleep at the wheel (A), but he would have crashed anyway 
because of black ice up ahead (A-2), there is an important sense in 
which the two crashes would not be identical, with respect to 
what the car hits, at what time, at what angle, etc. In fact, the two 
crashes would not be the same event at all. In this way, the argu-
ment of preemption seems to employ a sort of philosophical 
cheating. In a more rigorous and accurate way, preemption can 
be rephrased using the type/token distinction. Type of events B, 
such as “crashing the car,” are indeed subject to preemption, but 
these are not a problem for Lewis. However, two token (specific) 
events can never be identical to each other, so that the same to-
ken of event can never have two causes such as in the above ex-
ample. Preemption is thus a flawed argument, not only against 
Lewis’s explanation of causation, but against all others as well. 
There is, however, one criticism of the possible worlds ap-
proach that is, perhaps, a little more original and cannot be dis-
missed as easily as the two objections above. While possible 
worlds do indeed seem to be a method of truth evaluation for 
counterfactual conditionals, it is worth examining precisely how 
this is achieved. In the example above, “If Jimmy had driven, he 
would have crashed his car,” we may check the validity of this 
statement using possible worlds. Assuming Jimmy did not drive 
(or crash his car) in our world, we take the nearest possible 
world – one in which Jimmy did indeed drive. Now, according 
to Lewis’s method we check whether Jimmy indeed crashed his 
car in this world. But here lies the problem, for there does not 
seem to be any easy way to decide whether this is true. In fact, it 
appears once again that we must rely on factors such as Jimmy’s 
driving record, road conditions, etc. Though things have become 
more complicated, we are back to using our intuitions regarding 
causation. Though intuition is a useful tool in philosophy, and 
one against which many theories and views can be tested, it is 
not at all helpful here – rather, determining a causal link using 
intuition is precisely what we sought to avoid. Lewis’s entire 
proposal can be viewed as an attempt to remove ourselves from 
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intuition by finding a more formal, less subjective way to deter-
mine the presence of causation. Indeed, worse than making no 
progress, it seems that the possible worlds proposal actively hin-
ders the effort. Starting from intuitions about causation, an entire 
complex proposal that is explanatorily and perhaps metaphysi-
cally demanding has been built, only to find that in the end it re-
lies on precisely the same intuition to make the final judgment 
call. This critique appears devastating unless some response to it 
can be found. 
Lewis’s proposal, while flawed, is not doomed. Though it 
may seem from the critiques above that possible worlds over-
complicate the situation without moving past the use of intui-
tion, it must be noted that causal dependence and causal chains 
are valuable insights, especially once the criticism from preemp-
tion is dismissed. In fact, the entire proposal could still be res-
cued with some suggestion of a way to move from our intuitions 
to a more mechanized explanation of causation once Lewis’s 
paradigm has been employed and a nearest possible world 
found. Until such time, however, it appears that while it is an 
interesting suggestion, this account of causation does not ad-
vance our understanding of the phenomenon significantly. Cau-
sation proves once again to be a slippery philosophical oppo-
nent, and much remains to be investigated.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 See Hume, Inquiries concerning Human Understanding and Con-
cerning the Principles of Morals..  
2 See Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation. 
3 See Lewis, "Causation,” 556-67; and Lewis, "Counterfactuals 
and Comparative Possibility," 418-46. 
4 Lewis, Counterfactuals,1-3. 
5 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, 1 – 92. 
6 Lewis, "Causation,” 556-67. 
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